Worley, Dale R (Dale)
2010-12-13 22:09:48 UTC
======================================================================
RFC5479, "Requirements and Analysis of Media Security Management Protocols"
Source of RFC: sip (rai)
Errata ID: 2602
Status: Reported
Type: Technical
Reported By: Fabio Pietrosanti
Date Reported: 2010-11-04
Section A.5.2 says:
SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS
Not applicable; SDP Security Descriptions does not have a long-
term secret.
It should say:
SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS
The PFS feature of SDP Security Description with SIPS rely on
TLS and the availability or not of PFS for SRTP calls depends
on the negotiated TLS key negotiation algorithm.
If the selected TLS key negotiation algorithm of SIPS provide
PFS feature, then the underlying SRTP encryption will support
PFS. For example TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA provde PFS
feature as described in RFC5246. If the selected TLS key
negotiation algorithm of SIPS does not provide PFS feature,
then the underlying SRTP encryption will not support PFS.
For example TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA does not provide PFS
feature as described in RFC5246.
Notes:
It's not true that SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS have PFS "Not
applicable" because the SDES rely on TLS that is part of the security
scheme.
Practically if the long terms keys (the x509v3 RSA key of SIPS server)
is compromised, the TLS sessions can be decrypted, the SDES key
extracted and SRTP calls deciphered.
TLS support key exchange methods that provide PFS trough the use of
Ephemeral Diffie Hellman keys.
When SIPS use TLS with DHE key negotiation, then SDES acquire PFS
feature because even in case of long-term key compromise (the server
x509v3 RSA key), the short term keys (the SDES keys exchanged) will be
safe.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommended status: (correct) Verified (publish)
Should be reviewed by a security expert.
It seems that the entry for "SDP Security Descriptions with S/MIME" is
also incorrect, as revelation of the private keys of the participants
will render the SDES readable. I think better phrasing of the revised
wording is:
SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS
PFS if the selected TLS cipher suites for the SIPS hops provide PFS.
SDP Security Descriptions with S/MIME
No PFS.
This needs to be reviewed by a security expert.
======================================================================
RFC5479, "Requirements and Analysis of Media Security Management Protocols"
Source of RFC: sip (rai)
Errata ID: 2120
Status: Reported
Type: Editorial
Reported By: Alfred Hoenes
Date Reported: 2010-04-05
Section 4.4,3rd para says:
| A typical case of using media security where two entities are having
a Voice over IP (VoIP) conversation over IP-capable networks.
[...]
It should say:
| A typical case of using media security is where two entities are
having a Voice over IP (VoIP) conversation over IP-capable networks.
[...]
Notes:
Rationale: missing verb.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommended status: (correct) Hold for document update
======================================================================
Dale
_______________________________________________
Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip
This list is essentially closed and only used for finishing old business.
Use sip-***@cs.columbia.edu for questions on how to develop a SIP implementation.
Use ***@ietf.org for new developments on the application of sip.
Use ***@ietf.org for issues related to maintenance of the core SIP specifications.
RFC5479, "Requirements and Analysis of Media Security Management Protocols"
Source of RFC: sip (rai)
Errata ID: 2602
Status: Reported
Type: Technical
Reported By: Fabio Pietrosanti
Date Reported: 2010-11-04
Section A.5.2 says:
SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS
Not applicable; SDP Security Descriptions does not have a long-
term secret.
It should say:
SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS
The PFS feature of SDP Security Description with SIPS rely on
TLS and the availability or not of PFS for SRTP calls depends
on the negotiated TLS key negotiation algorithm.
If the selected TLS key negotiation algorithm of SIPS provide
PFS feature, then the underlying SRTP encryption will support
PFS. For example TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA provde PFS
feature as described in RFC5246. If the selected TLS key
negotiation algorithm of SIPS does not provide PFS feature,
then the underlying SRTP encryption will not support PFS.
For example TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA does not provide PFS
feature as described in RFC5246.
Notes:
It's not true that SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS have PFS "Not
applicable" because the SDES rely on TLS that is part of the security
scheme.
Practically if the long terms keys (the x509v3 RSA key of SIPS server)
is compromised, the TLS sessions can be decrypted, the SDES key
extracted and SRTP calls deciphered.
TLS support key exchange methods that provide PFS trough the use of
Ephemeral Diffie Hellman keys.
When SIPS use TLS with DHE key negotiation, then SDES acquire PFS
feature because even in case of long-term key compromise (the server
x509v3 RSA key), the short term keys (the SDES keys exchanged) will be
safe.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommended status: (correct) Verified (publish)
Should be reviewed by a security expert.
It seems that the entry for "SDP Security Descriptions with S/MIME" is
also incorrect, as revelation of the private keys of the participants
will render the SDES readable. I think better phrasing of the revised
wording is:
SDP Security Descriptions with SIPS
PFS if the selected TLS cipher suites for the SIPS hops provide PFS.
SDP Security Descriptions with S/MIME
No PFS.
This needs to be reviewed by a security expert.
======================================================================
RFC5479, "Requirements and Analysis of Media Security Management Protocols"
Source of RFC: sip (rai)
Errata ID: 2120
Status: Reported
Type: Editorial
Reported By: Alfred Hoenes
Date Reported: 2010-04-05
Section 4.4,3rd para says:
| A typical case of using media security where two entities are having
a Voice over IP (VoIP) conversation over IP-capable networks.
[...]
It should say:
| A typical case of using media security is where two entities are
having a Voice over IP (VoIP) conversation over IP-capable networks.
[...]
Notes:
Rationale: missing verb.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommended status: (correct) Hold for document update
======================================================================
Dale
_______________________________________________
Sip mailing list https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sip
This list is essentially closed and only used for finishing old business.
Use sip-***@cs.columbia.edu for questions on how to develop a SIP implementation.
Use ***@ietf.org for new developments on the application of sip.
Use ***@ietf.org for issues related to maintenance of the core SIP specifications.